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Abstract
Nowadays, international trade with Islamic countries, specifically the Gulf States (GCC), 
is increasing and the Western World is beginning to show an interest in Islamic jurispru-
dence regarding commercial transactions, from which most rules on commercial laws in 
Islamic countries are derived. Such outside interest is associated with increasing calls from 
within Islamic countries in the Middle East for a return to Sharīʿah law as source of juris-
diction in all aspects of life. The most significant of such calls concerns individuals, propri-
eties and trade. Arbitration is an alternative method of resolving commercial conflicts that 
is rapid and peaceful. Arbitration is one of the concepts in Islamic law which Western 
jurisprudence has tried to understand in the context of Islamic jurisdiction philosophy: e.g., 
how it was referenced in past books on jurisprudence and how it has developed in recent 
times as shown in modern writing. Arbitration can be intermixed with other contracts; for 
example, arbitration and the reconciliatory ṣulḥ contract are major concepts in Sharīʿah law 
that require study and profound analysis to distinguish clearly how Islamic scholars under-
stand them and to eliminate what could cause confusion for non-Sharīʿah experts. This 
article explores the Sharīʿah notion of ṣulḥ and arbitration in theory and practice by dem-
onstrating how these two contracts are applied in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the coun-
try most likely to derive laws from the Sharīʿah at the present time.
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1. General Introduction
The Islamic Sharīʿah1 is based upon the attraction of interests and preven-
tion of harm to human beings,2 i.e. the principle that everything of interest 
to human beings that does not cause harm is permissible (i.e. ḥalāl ), with-
out regard to whether the thing is beneficial in whole or in part.3
Without doubt arbitration can prove beneficial to conflicting parties in 
that it can end conflicts rapidly with minimal costs. Moreover, arbitration 
is undertaken willingly by the conflicting parties as method to settle their 
dispute. Arbitration has been provided and recognized by the four sources 
of the Sharīʿah: the Qurʾān, the Sunnah (Prophetic tradition), ijmaʿ (con-
sensus of opinion)4 and qiyās (reasoning by analogy).5 As a means for 
resolving disputes according to certain rules and conditions, arbitration 
differs between Islamic Schools of jurisprudence.6 Over time, and through 
a succession of civilizations up to modern Western world, the notion of 
arbitration has developed greatly to become the preferred instrument for 
resolving international trade disputes and now considered superior to a 
traditional method in the Judiciary System.7 The legality of arbitration 
1 “Sharīʿah is an Arabic word meaning the road to be followed. Literally it means ‘the 
way to a watering place’. It is the path shown by Allāh, the Creator Himself, through His 
Messenger, the Prophet Muḥammad.” See Abd ar-Rahman I. Doi & Abdassamad Clarke, 
Sharīʿah Islamic Law (London: Ta-Ha Publishers, 2008) p. 23.
2 See, e.g., F. Kutty “The Sharīʿah Factor in International Commercial Arbitration”, LA 
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 28 (2006): 566.
3 Ibn Taymiyyah, Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, Collections of Fatwā of Ibn Taymiyyah 
al-Ḥanbalī, Vol. 11 (1985), pp. 344-345.
4 In the technical sense, ijmaʿ is defined as: [t]he consensus of mujtahids (independent 
jurists) from the ummah of Muḥammad (PBUH), after his death, in a determined period 
upon a rule of Islamic law (ḥukm sharīʿah). Nyazee, Imran Ahsan Khan, Islamic Jurispru-
dence (New Delhi: Adam Publishers, 2006) p. 183.
5 In the technical sense, qiyās as defined by Islamic jurists applies to “the assignment of 
the ḥukm of an existing case found in the texts of the Qurʾān, the Sunnah, or ijmaʿ to a new 
case whose ḥukm is not found in these sources on the basis of a common underlying attri-
bute called the ʿillah of the ḥukmʾ. See Nyazee, supra note 4, p. 214.
6 The majority of Muslims today hold to one of the four main Islamic Schools: Ḥanafī, 
Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī. For more useful information, see, e.g., Doi & Clarke, supra 
note 1, pp. 131-167.
7 Mark A. Bunchanan, “Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration”, Am. 
Bus. Law J. 26(1988): 511-512.
 E.A. Alsheikh / Arab Law Quarterly 25 (2011) 367-400 369
in the Sharīʿah is derived from the Qurʾān,8 the Sunnah9 and ijmaʿ10 and 
thus requires no further evidence. However, evidence for its legality can be 
derived from the following verse: Allāh commanded the people that when 
there is a problem between husband and wife to appoint two arbitrators—
one from the family of the husband and one from the family of the wife. 
This text clearly makes arbitration between husband and wife permissible. 
If arbitration is permissible for resolving matrimonial conflicts, it should 
also be allowed for other conflicts by way of qiyās (reasoning by analogy), 
which is one source of the Sharīʿah. Philosophically, if the use of arbitration 
is permissible to bridge family—the prime nucleus of society—disputes, 
then it should also be permissible to resolve conflicts between members 
of society to avoid a rift in the social entity that is in the public’s interest 
(al-maṣlaḥah al-mursalah).11 The term maṣlaḥah mursalah is applied when 
 8 The Holy Qurʾān contains verses from which Sharīʿah jurists derived the arbitration 
legality, such as, e.g.:
And if you fear a breach between the two, then appoint a judge from his people and a 
judge from her people; if the both desire agreement, Allāh will effect harmony between 
them, surely Allāh is Knowing, Aware. (Q3:35).
 9 The legality of arbitration in the Sunnah is derived from the fact that Prophet 
Muḥammad (PBUH) consented to arbitrate between Jews of Bani Gurizah when they 
requested him to do so. He appointed Saʿad ibn Muʾaz to arbitrate and then recognized the 
award made by him and ordered it to be carried out. This became tangible evidence that 
arbitration is both permissible and legal. (See Abū Dāwud & Sulaiman al-Sajestanī, Sunan 
Abī Dāwud, quested by Muḥammad Mohiedeen Abdulhameed, Dār al-Fikr for Publishing 
and Distribution, Vol. 4, p. 289, Ḥadīth 4955. See also Al-Nisaee, Aḥmad bin Shuwaib, 
Al-Sunnah al-Kubrā, reviewed by Abdulgafar Al-Bandari, and Syid, Vol. 3, p. 466, Ḥadīth 
5940/1, corrected by Al-Albanī, Erwa al-Ghaleel al-Albanī (Beirut: Al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 
1979) Vol. 8, p. 237.
10 Sharīʿah jurists differ in opinion regarding the matter of arbitration and its permissi-
bility. They fall within one of three opinions. The first opinion is that arbitration is totally 
permissible, whether or not there is a judge in the city. This opinion is held by the four 
main jurisprudence schools: Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī, plus Ziadī and some 
Shīʾa. They rely upon texts from the Qurʾān, the Sunnah, ijmaʿ and qiyās, in each of which 
arbitration is mentioned. The second opinion holds that arbitration is permissible, pro-
vided that there is no judge in the city.
11 Al-maṣlaḥah al-mursalah, sometimes referred to in the plural as al-maṣlaḥah al-mur-
salah, is a highly flexible and advanced type of analogy. It is employed when jurists cannot 
find a rule for the case at hand through literal interpretation or strict analogy (qiyās), 
because there is no specific base (aṣl ) from which he can extend the rule by analogy. In 
other words, neither individual nor specific evidence controls the law. See Nyazee, supra 
note 4, p. 241.
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an issue is not referred to in Qurʾānic text.12 In other words, we turn to the 
concept ‘public interest’ when we lack supportive Qurʾānic text, provided 
that no other text contradicts the issue that one is trying to prove. Doi and 
Clarke stated that:
It should be noted that the concept of public welfare and general interest can really be 
very helpful particularly in cases which are not regulated by any authoritative text of 
Book of Allāh, the Sunnah or ijmaʿ. In that case, equitable consideration may override 
the results of strict qiyās, taking public interest into consideration.13
It is noteworthy that the connotation of ‘muṣlaḥah’ in Arabic differs com-
pletely from the meaning of al-maṣlaḥah al-mursalah in the Sharīʿah. For 
this reason, arbitration falls under the linguistic meaning of muṣlaḥah and 
not under the notion of al-maṣlaḥah al-mursalah in the Sharīʿah. This is 
commonly misunderstood by researchers who try to understand arbitra-
tion through the notion of maṣlaḥah mursalah, where the legal and linguis-
tic connotations can create confusion. This is the opinion of some scholars 
from the Shāfiʿī School, based on their belief that arbitration is second to 
judicature and that a judge is the principal arbiter of conflicts. Hence, 
some Shāfiʿī jurists believe that arbitration is not permissible while a judge 
is present. Contrary to this opinion, however, it can be stated that an arbi-
trator serves in place of a judge, helping him to resolve the conflict. Fur-
ther, since it is not explicitly forbidden in the Sharīʿah, arbitration remains 
permissible because the original judgment on issues, contracts, and trans-
actions is permissible unless a specific text renders it otherwise. A third 
opinion held by a number of Shāfiʿī jurists, and Al-Khawārij, who opine 
that arbitration is never permissible, based on the fact that conflict resolu-
tion is the basic function of the Great Imām and anyone to whom he 
delegates this authority. Hence, arbitration is an assault upon the authority 
of the Imām, his deputies and judges. However, this opinion can also be 
challenged on the basis that arbitration does not invade the Imam’s author-
ity because the arbitrator has no authority to imprison or to implement a 
judgment. The arbitrator may only resolve conflicts based upon justice and 
reasonability, which Islam does not prohibit.14
12 Al-Jizani, Muḥammad bin Hussain, Maʿlim Usūl al-Fiqh ʿan Ahl al-Sunnah wa Ijmāʿ, 
7th edn. (Riyadh: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 2007), p. 236.
13 Doi & Clarke, supra note 1, p. 125.
14 Ibn Najeem, Zain Aldeen Ibn Ibraheem, Al-Bahr al-Raʾiq, Vol. 7, (Beirut: Dār 
al-Māʿrifah) p. 42. Al-Ramli, Nihayat al-Muhtaj, Vol. 8, p. 230. Al-Kharshi, Muh ̣ammad 
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2. Concept and Types of Reconciliation: Sụlḥ in the Sharīʿah
The concept ‘reconciliation’, ṣulḥ in the Sharīʿah, means a contract that is 
concluded by two parties, under which each party waives part of his rights 
for the purpose of reaching a mutual and final resolution of a conflict.15 To 
illustrate, suppose that someone claims that he is owed ₤1,000,000, 
although he has no evidence to prove his claim. In contrast, the defendant 
agrees that he owes the plaintiff money, but not in excess of ₤700,000. The 
plaintiff could settle the dispute by agreeing with the defendant to accept 
payment of ₤700,000, provided that the payment is final and complete 
and that their conflict will end upon payment of the agreed amount of 
money. This type of reconciliatory contract is just as common today as it 
was in the past. Sharīʿah jurists ( faqīh, pl. fuqahāʾ) mention in their legal 
writings that conflicting parties conclude a contract of reconciliation to be 
authenticated by a judge ending the conflict between them. The jurists 
insisted that the judge has no power to compel the parties to conclude by 
reconciliation in the event that one or both parties refuses. On this point 
in particular, the similarity between reconciliation and arbitration con-
tracts is apparent in that each type of contract is considered a supplemen-
tary manner to resolve conflict. Because these contracts are optional, the 
judge has no power to compel conflicting parties to enter such a contract. 
Only if the parties agree to such a contract will the judge have the power 
to order the parties to enter the contract and end the conflict. The same 
situation occurs if the parties have agreed in advance to solve their conflict 
through arbitration or to conclude an arbitration agreement. The judge 
will compel the parties to arbitrate in accordance with their agreement. 
Such issues fall under the general theory of contracts in the Sharīʿah,16 
which requests that people adhere to contracts they conclude and remem-
ber that steadfastness to ones deeds comes under the philosophy of faith, 
bin Abdullah, Sharh al-Kharshī, Vol. 7 (Beirut: Dār Sadr) p. 145. Ibn Rushd, Muḥammad 
bin Aḥmad, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār Al-Fikr), p. 452. Ibn Gudamah, 
Abdullah bin Aḥmad, Al-Mughni, Vol. 11 (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī) p. 483. Al-
Mardawi, Alī bin Suliman, Al-Insaf, Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār Ihyaʾ al-Turath al-ʿArabī), p. 197. 
Al-Murtada, Aḥmad bin Yahya, Al-Bahr al-Zakhar, 2nd edn., Vol. 6 (Beirut: Al-Risalah) 
pp. 113-114. Al-Amili, Muḥammad al-Jawad, Muftah al-Karama, Vol. 10 (Damascus) 
p. 3.
15 Al-Zailaie, Othman ibn Alī, Tabyīn al-Haqāʾiq Sharʾh Kanzu ad-Daqāʾiq, 2nd edn., 
Vol. 5 (Beirut: Dār al-Māʿrifah) p. 29. Ibn Qudamah, Abdellah ibn Ah ̣med, Al-Mughni, 
Vol. 4 (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb) p. 476.
16 Sūrah Al-Māʾidah, Q5:1.
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which every Muslim must in any event follow in his/her commercial 
transactions and marriage affairs toward both Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike.
The idea discussed above, which is only one form of a reconciliation 
contract under the Sharīʿah, is referred to as ‘reconciliation in the case of 
denial by the defendant’. This form of reconciliation is permissible in the 
opinion of Ḥanafī,17 Mālikī,18 and Ḥanbalī,19 but not Shāfiʿī,20 jurists. In 
such a case, the defendant denies the debt or immovable thing that the 
plaintiff claims while admitting that the plaintiff has a right to less than 
what he is claiming. Accordingly, admission and denial occur simultane-
ously. The majority of Islamic jurists share the opinion that the notion of 
ṣulḥ is permissible according to the Qurʾān, the Sunnah,21 and ijmaʿ. Under 
such circumstances, there is nothing to prevent the conflicting parties from 
drawing up a ṣulḥ contract to end their conflict. On the other hand, Shāfiʿī 
jurists opine that, in such cases, ṣulḥ is not permissible by asserting that, in 
the event of a defendant’s denial, ṣulḥ falls under Prophet Muḥammad’s 
(PBUH) directive not to make ṣulḥ, which makes ill-gotten things permis-
sible in Islam. Further, a defendant’s act of paying money solely for the 
sake of ending the conflict is similar to the act of giving a bribe, which is 
not permissible in Islam. In fact, this reasoning is invalid because ṣulḥ, 
which is not permissible according to the above-mentioned Ḥadīth, is the 
form in which ṣulḥ is a tool to make permissible a thing that is ill-gotten in 
everyone’s opinion. An example would be if the plaintiff were to give the 
defendant wine or pork to end their conflict. It could be said that this form 
of ṣulḥ is inapplicable here because the defendant is agreeing to pay money 
or requital as the case may be to avoid responsibility and end the conflict, 
thereby saving himself from banality and protecting his name and self 
from becoming vulnerable to judicial authority. The Sharīʿah does not 
17 Al-Zailaie, supra note 15.
18 Ibn Rush, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad, Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nihayat al-Muqtasid, 
Vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr) p. 290.
19 Ibn Qudamah, supra note 15.
20 Al-Shirbini, Muḥammad al-Khateeb, Mughni al-Muhtaj ʿ alā Marifat maʿnī al-Minhaj 
(Cairo: Mustafa al-Babī al-Halabī Printing Press, 1985) p. 179 et seq.
21 Allāh the Almighty said: ([m]aking peace is better), Sūrah An-Nisāʾ, Q4:128. Prophet 
Muḥammad (PBUH) said that ṣulḥ is permissible between Muslims, except when it makes 
ill-gotten things permissible or vice versa. This Ḥadīth has been proven correct; see Ibn 
Hajar, Aḥmad ibn Alī ibn Muh ̣ammad, Al-Talkhīs al-Habīr fī Takhrīj Aḥadīth al-Rafī 
al-Kabīr (Cairo: Ibn Taymiyyah Printing Press), p. 249.
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prevent a person from keeping himself safe and out of harm’s way, even 
incorporeal harm, by offering money. On the other hand, the plaintiff is 
taking money from the defendant as compensation for his assured right. 
Hence, the Sharīʿah does not prevent him from doing so. This is the phi-
losophy supporting judicial opinions claiming that this form of ṣulḥ con-
tract is permissible in the Sharīʿah. On this basis, such jurists maintain that 
jurisprudence identifies22 this form of ṣulḥ contract as having a compensa-
tory nature: the plaintiff perceives receipt of money as compensation of his 
right while the defendant perceives the contract as a tool to avoid taking 
an ‘oath’ before the judge. Hence the Sharīʿah rules that: “evidence is 
required of a claimant and an oath is required of someone who denies [the 
claim]”.23 Another form mentioned by jurists is to make ṣulḥ with a defen-
dant who has admitted the right. Here the defendant admits the plaintiff ’s 
claim, while agreeing to pay a certain amount of money or offering some-
thing in return for settling the debt and ending the conflict. As illustration, 
assume that someone claims that another individual borrowed ₤100,000 
in 2007, although he has no supporting evidence. If the defendant never-
theless admits his debt and offers to give the plaintiff an apartment in sat-
isfaction of the debt, the conflict is ended with ṣulḥ, which will be classified 
according to the most similar contract. In this example, ṣulḥ will take the 
form of a sales contract. Because the apartment is given against the debt, 
ṣulḥ follows all the rules of a contract of sale, such as emergence of the right 
of pre-emption for neighbours if the payment is land instead of real estate. 
Similarly, because the plaintiff acquires the right to return a defective 
thing, he could reject an inferior apartment if its value is insufficient. 
Moreover, the price must be known and determinant for the ṣulḥ contract 
to be valid, similar to the case of a sales contract.
Another form of ṣulḥ involves a defendant who neither admits nor 
denies but rather agrees to give a thing or pay a certain amount of money 
to the plaintiff for the sake of ending their conflict. This form of ṣulḥ is 
considered permissible by the majority of jurists. However, Shāfiʿī jurists, 
who forbid it,24 argue that the defendant’s silence should be interpreted as 
22 Ibn Rushd, supra note 14.
23 Al-Bukharī, Muḥammad Ibn Ismail, Sahih al-Bukharī, 3rd edn., reviewed by Dr. 
Mustafa Deeb Al-Bagha (Beirut: Dār Ibn Khathīr, 1987). Ḥadīth No. 4187, Al-Qasheeri, 
Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj (Beirut: Dār Ihyaʾ al-Turath), Sahih al-Muslim, reviewed by 
Muḥammad Fuwad Abdelbaqi, Ḥadīth No. 3228, see also in general Doi & Clarke, supra 
note 1, pp. 36-37.
24 Al-Shirbini, supra note 20.
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a denial of the case, consequently making ṣulḥ neither permissible nor 
achievable. Contrary to this position, it could be argued that the defen-
dant’s silence can be interpreted in many ways. For example, he could be 
hesitant and unsure about the claim, yet at the same time wish to exoner-
ate himself before Allāh by reconciling with the plaintiff to pay a certain 
amount of money or to give a specific thing to end their conflict. It is 
worth mentioning that, in Sharīʿah law, jurisprudential applications, ethi-
cal and religious values are assimilated in the fear of punishment by an 
individual in the Hereafter and are mixed with materialistic values built on 
material evidence in procedural claims and commercial transactions. As a 
result, an individual could forfeit material gain for the merit of sustaining 
peace of mind between himself and Allāh. The best achievement would be 
to disperse the culture of ṣulḥ among members of society as a means to 
resolve conflict and to erase hatred from human hearts, i.e. in essence the 
effect which the Sharīʿah strives for through its values and directives.
Part of the similarity between ṣulḥ and arbitration contracts are the con-
ditions that must be available to the party concluding the contract. For 
example, the person who concludes ṣulḥ must be sane, because both the 
insane and minors25 have no eligibility. Moreover, ṣulḥ must not disfavour 
a minor if it is to be performed by his custodian. Just as in arbitration, if 
one of the parties to the arbitration is a minor, the custodian must make 
certain that ṣulḥ or arbitration does not disfavour the minor; otherwise the 
contract will be invalid.
The subject26 of ṣulḥ contracts must be treasury (of financial value), or 
something similar such as real estate, owned by the defendant and known 
to the parties. Jurists list important types of dispute that could occur 
between people today, and upon which ṣulḥ may be applied, although not 
purely permitted by the Sharīʿah as subject of ṣulḥ, at least in the opinions 
of some jurists. The three most significant situations are the following.
In the first situation, debt is deferred, and the debtor and creditor are 
reconciled that part is to be paid in advance while the remainder is waived. 
For example, say a ₤1,000 debt is to be paid after 1 year, and the creditor 
reconciles with the debtor to accept ₤800 now on condition that the 
remaining ₤200 will be waived. This form of ṣulḥ is not permissible in the 
25 “A minor (someone who has not reached the age of puberty)”; see Doi & Clarke, 
supra note 1, p. 553.
26 The subject matter in this instance is the price paid by the defendant to the plaintiff 
to end their conflict.
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opinion of most jurists because in this case the ṣulḥ contract becomes a 
compensation contract, for which the price is delay in payment. Since 
delay is not of a financial nature (māl ),27 it cannot be equated with price 
in a ṣulḥ contract. Such jurists find some similarities between credit usury 
(ribā)28 and this type of ṣulḥ. They also see delay in payment as vital to 
addition in credit usury and vital to diminution in this form of ṣulḥ. Ibn 
al-Qiyyam29 has discussed this opinion. He and his teacher, Ibn Taymiyyah,30 
are of the opinion that this form of ṣulḥ is permissible. They reason that 
this form of ṣulḥ is ultimately counter to usury, because usury includes an 
addition in one of the payments as the price of delay. Hence, in this type 
of ṣulḥ, part of the price is waivered instead of making an advanced pay-
ment. Both parties benefit such action; there is no question of usury which 
is an addition, which is absent in this case. Ibn al-Qiyyam’s reasoning is 
upright and logical in that both parties obtain benefits, but without usury. 
Accordingly, this falls within what is permissible which rests upon the 
consent of both parties, by one party waiving some of his rights to benefit 
in return for being paid in advance by the other party.
In the second situation, debt is immediate, and the plaintiff reconciles 
with the defendant to pay part of the debt within a certain time. As illus-
tration, suppose that the debt is ₤100,000 pounds. The plaintiff agrees 
with the defendant to pay only ₤90,000 in full satisfaction of the debt, but 
he fixes a time for the payment to be made on Friday. If the defendant fails 
to pay on Friday is he then liable to pay the ₤90,000 or ₤100,000? Jurists 
are of two opinions on this question. Abū Ḥanifah and his student, 
Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥassan, said that, if the payment is not made on Fri-
day, the debt will return to its original status, and ṣulḥ will be nullified 
because the defendant did not adhere to the plaintiff ’s stipulation. Abū 
Yusuf, who is also a student of Abū Ḥanifah, argues that the ṣulḥ contract 
includes suspension in that part of the debt is being waived upon the con-
dition that payment is actually made. He contends, however, that waiving 
27 “Māl is something that exists and can be held in use and be beneficial at the time of 
need”; see Doi & Clarke, supra note 1, p. 551.
28 Ribā is basically any amount of interest on capital loan; see Coulson, N.J., A History 
of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995) p. 239.
29 Ibn al-Qiyyam, Muḥammad Ibn Abī Bakr, ʿalam al-Muwaqīn ʿan Rabb al-ʿAlamīna, 
Vol. 3 (Al-Sādah Printing), p. 371. It is worth mentioning that this opinion is said to be 
that of Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (Allāh’s mercy be upon him).
30 Al-Baʾali, Muḥammad bin Abbas, Al-Ikhtiyarat al-ʿIlmiyyah min Futawāʾ Ibn Taymiy-
yah (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2000), p. 134.
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cannot be suspended on conditions. Hence, if the plaintiff does not intend 
the defeasance of the contract, if the defendant does not fulfil his condi-
tion, then the ṣulḥ contract remains valid, and the defendant is liable to 
pay only the agreed amount. Logically, Abū Ḥanifah’s opinion is more 
viable and practical, because it must be concluded from his having sus-
pended the waiving of his right on a condition and a specific time that the 
plaintiff suspended the contract defeasance on those terms. Otherwise, the 
condition would be without value. Moreover, following Abū Yusuf ’s 
opinion would render the possibility that such ṣulḥ contracts would be 
impossible, for it would endanger the plaintiff should the defendant fail to 
adhere to the condition, in which case the underlying claim would remain 
in full force. This would particularly be the case if the defendant realized 
that he benefited from the ṣulḥ contract immediately after entering into it, 
for part of the debt has been waived and his obligation to pay within the 
specific timeframe or not at all, will not affect that waiver. The plaintiff 
who proposed the ṣulḥ contract is supposed to be the most powerful party 
but he will become the weaker party, which is not permissible. The plain-
tiff should remain the strong party while the defendant’s role is to adhere 
to the conditions stipulated if the contract is to be of value for both, and 
not just one, parties. This is the philosophy intended by a ṣulḥ contract in 
the Sharīʿah.
The third situation occurs when the conflicting parties agree to recon-
cile and the price offered is a benefit rather than a tangible thing or money. 
In other words, the defendant, who owes the plaintiff ₤10,000 pounds, 
agrees to give the plaintiff use of his apartment for 1 month in an area 
popular among tourists in lieu of paying the amount owed in funds. In 
this case, jurists say that the ṣulḥ contract is permissible, in that it resembles 
a rental contract.31 As stated earlier, a ṣulh ̣ contract assumes the form of the 
most similar contract. Ḥanafī jurisprudence is distinct from the three other 
schools in that it deals with many hypothetical cases, some of which 
occurred in past eras and others in modern times. No doubt the existence 
of solutions for hypothetical cases gives evidence of the richness of the 
Ḥanafī School, of which we are badly in need nowadays. This is especially 
so in light of many emerging issues and new commercial transactions that 
require intelligence and the ability to study new contracts and issue juris-
prudential solutions that are suitable, effective, flexible and do not collide 
31 Al-Kasani, Alaoldeen Abū Bakr, Badayī al-Sanayī fī Tartīb al-Sharīʿah, Vol. 6 (The 
Scientific Publications Co.), p. 47. See also Ibn Qudamah, supra note 15, p. 483.
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with common Sharīʿah rules. Hence, we should do away with stagnancy in 
jurisprudence, which agitates unreal doubt about Sharīʿah’s capability to 
escort new issues into all the modern fields of human inquiry.
3. Similarities between Sụlḥ and Arbitration from an Islamic Point 
of View
3.1. Mutual Consideration between Parties
Similar to all other contracts, ṣulḥ and arbitration are based upon the 
mutual free will of the parties, who draw up a binding contract, as long as 
the contract has been concluded free of any intentional flaws or reasons for 
annulment. That two contesting parties seek alternative methods of con-
flict resolution is urgently needed and sign of healthy behaviour in a 
humanitarian society. Parties are prompted to seek alternative means of 
resolution out of the intention latent in every human being to main peace-
ful co-existence, harmony and reconciliation, which in turn manifests itself 
in the form of legal actions.
3.2. The Contract Is Binding Upon All Parties
Sụlḥ is a contract that binds both consenting parties from the time of its 
conclusion. Arbitration differs as will be explained later. In the Sharīʿah, 
the principal rule with regard to an arbitration contract is that the contract 
is binding upon both parties once the arbitration begins.32 The judge takes 
the responsibility of executing ṣulḥ, or the arbitration contract, in case one 
or both parties needs judicial intervention. Al-Ramahi says that the ṣulḥ 
contract is not binding unless it is concluded before the judge. She points 
out: “[t]he agreement of such is not binding unless it has taken place before 
the court.”33
This notion is non-admissible for a ṣulḥ contract which is binding upon 
both parties from the time of its conclusion. Here all legal effects fall upon 
the contracting parties. When a conflict over the terms in the contract 
arises, or when one party refuses to adhere to the contract, the judge may 
32 Ad-Dirdir, Asharh as-Saghīr, Vol. 2 (Essa al-Halabi Publications, 1976), p. 516.
33 Al-Ramahi, A. (2008) Ṣulḥ: A Crucial Part of Islamic Arbitration, Islamic Law and 
Law of the Muslim World, Research Paper Series at New York Law School, No. 08-45, 
p. 12.
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compel the repudiating party to fulfil his obligations under the ṣulḥ con-
tract. The Sharīʿah advocates adherence to contracts in accordance with 
many Qurʾānic or Sunnah texts, as mentioned earlier.34 Moreover, under 
the Sharīʿah, arbitration and ṣulḥ contracts are not nullified by the death of 
the one of the parties but instead bind the inheritors by the conditions of 
these contracts.
3.3. The Substantive Scope
The similarity between arbitration and ṣulḥ contracts appears on a subjec-
tive level, for in the Sharīʿah the scope for arbitration is the same as that for 
ṣulḥ.35 In other words, all matters that can be subject to ṣulḥ can be subject 
to arbitration. It may be suitable not to explain the scope of ṣulḥ in detail 
here, but only to state briefly that, to be valid, a ṣulḥ contract must fall 
within the rights of the human being, not Allāh, ḥudūd, or tazīr,36 because 
the rights of a human being can be waived and not the rights of Allāh.
3.4. The Benefit
Sụlḥ and arbitration37 share the fact that each results in resolving disputes 
between parties. After a ṣulḥ contract is concluded, it is binding upon both 
parties,38 such that it is not permissible for one party to refuse the contract 
or to claim the same thing or right before the court. Similarly, Ḥanafī, 
Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī scholars are of the same opinion that arbitra-
tion is binding upon both parties once it has been declared by the arbitra-
tor as ending a conflict. Arbitration differs from ṣulḥ in that its contract 
can be concluded before or after the disputes occurs, whereas a ṣulḥ con-
tract is normally concluded after a conflict arises.39
34 See supra note 14.
35 Al-Mawirdi, Adab al-Qadī, 4th edn., Vol. 2 (Baghdad: Dār Ihyaʾ al-Turath al-Islāmī, 
1972) p. 380.
36 Al-Zailaie, supra note 15, p. 37.
37 See, e.g., Doi & Clarke, supra note 1, p. 576.
38 Al-Sarakhsi, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmed, 2nd edn., Al-Mabsut, Vol. 20 (Cairo: Dār 
al-Māʿrifah) p. 163.
39 Al-Ramahi, supra note 33, p. 12.
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3.5. The Obligation Ended by Contract between the Parties
If we scrutinize the opinions of jurists for conditions that can nullify a ṣulḥ 
contract, and in turn end the obligations upon the contracting parties, we 
will find similarities between ṣulḥ and arbitration, manifested as follows:
(A) Jurists name the agreement between contracting parities to end the 
obligation and consider the contract null and void as discharge40 or 
“al-iqālah” in the context of a ṣulḥ, which is called arbitrator dis-
missal in arbitration.41
(B) Absence of eligibility on part of the contract of both42 parties, fac-
ing it eligibility of arbitrator43 or one of the conflicting parties 
before the issuance of the arbitration award.
Jurists have stated that the death of one party to a ṣulḥ contract, in which 
payment is a benefit and not money or real estate, renders the contract of 
ṣulḥ void if death occurred before the end of the agreed period of time 
determined by the parties, during which the benefit is supposed to be 
acquired by the beneficiary party. The same is not the case for an arbitra-
tion contract, for which jurists did not declare that death of one of the 
arbitrating parties renders the arbitration contract null and void. El-Ahdab44 
errs when he finds that the death of one party to an arbitration contract 
nullifies the contract. This might indicate that the death of one contracting 
party does not affect the arbitration contract that remains binding upon 
the inheritors upon the results of arbitration and, most importantly, the 
arbitration award.
3.6. Judges May Suggest that Both Disputing Parties Choose Either 
Reconciliation or Arbitration as Alternative Means to Resolve the Conflict
This point is confirmed by practical applications. For example, in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in some cases judges frequently offer arbitration 
if the conflicting parties wish to quickly resolve their conflict. The same 
40 Al-Zailaie, supra note 15, pp. 32-34.
41 Al-Girafi, Ahmad bin Edrees, Al-Furūq, Vol. 4 (Beirut: Dār al-Māʿrifah), p. 13.
42 Al-Kasani, supra note 31, p. 54.
43 Al-Fatawāʾ al-Hindiyyah, narrated by a group of Indian Scholars from the Ḥanafī 
School in the 11th century Hijrah (17th century CE).
44 Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, The Arbitration Encyclopedia, Vol. 1 (Cairo: Dār al-Māʿrifah) 
p. 49.
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applies to reconciliation which judges frequently offer in court to resolve 
conflicts amicably, rather than through judicial judgment. This will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 4, below.
4. How Do Mediation, Conciliation and Reconciliatory Sụlh ̣ Differ 
from an Islamic Perspective?
In fact, if we scrutinize the writings of Islamic jurists, we will not find cita-
tions on mediation as a means of conflict resolution. In contrast, jurists 
have studied the ṣulḥ contract in detail without differentiating between 
ṣulḥ, on one hand, and mediation and conciliation, on the other hand. 
This might possibly be due to the fact that mediation, like conciliation but 
unlike ṣulḥ and arbitration, is a voluntary means provided by an individual 
in society without having any obligatory effect on the conflicting parties 
and a third party. This philosophy may explain why jurisprudence neglects 
to mention mediation as a tool to achieve ṣulḥ from a third party. Practice 
confirms the existence of mediation in some cases during Islamic history, 
e.g. when Abdullah Ibn al-Abbas (blessings of Allāh upon him) was sent by 
Caliph Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib (blessings of Allāh upon him) to the Khawārij45 
to convince them to arbitrate, according to the famous story.46 Consider-
ing what has already been said and studying the general rules of the 
Sharīʿah, we will find a rich source supporting mediation as a moral and 
peaceful alternative undertaken by upright individuals in a society moti-
vated by purely humanitarian principles to resolve differences between 
people. In modern times, which has become very complicated, paid efforts 
to mediate can be excused, for mediation requires time and effort and may 
prove costly for individuals involved. However, the ethical and religious 
45 The Khawārij was a political group that arose at the time of Caliph Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib 
due to political differences at that time. Caliph Alī battled with them and defeated them at 
Nahrawan. Their numbers were 2,000, while Alī’s men numbered 70,000. This group 
disobeyed the orders of Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib and refused arbitration of the issue between Alī 
and Moawiyah, (May Allāh Bless them all). They had their reasons and justifications that 
had been discussed together them Abdullah Ibn Abbas, who had been sent as a mediator. 
He was able to convince a large group of them, although a few segments refused his opin-
ions and mediation. See Al-Shahristani, Muḥammad ibn Abdulkareem, Al-Millal wa 
l-Nihall, reviewed by Abdulaziz Muḥammad al-Wakeel, the Editor is Mostafa al-Halabi, 
p. 114).
46 See Al-Bayhaqi, Aḥmad ibn al-Hussain, Sunan al-Bayhaqī, Vol. 8 (Cairo: Dār al-
Fiqr), p. 178.
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aspects of mediation take priority. The Sunnah tells us that Prophet 
Muḥammad (PBUH) said the following to his companions:
May I tell you of a work better than praying, fasting, and charity, they replied by say-
ing, yes messenger of Allāh. He said, that is to mediate between those who had a 
conflict between them.47
This Ḥadīth is considered to be a tangible proof for the permissibility of 
mediation under the Sharīʿah in that Prophet Muḥammad (PBUH) ranked 
it superior to praying, fasting, and charity. This indicates the significance 
of mediation as a method to sustain peace and harmony between members 
of society, be they Muslims or non-Muslims. It is worth mentioning that 
the jargon of conciliation is used in the West, referring to mediation efforts 
undertaken by a third party to redress a dispute between conflicting parties 
under specific procedures. This classification is unknown in Sharīʿah law, 
in which there is no difference between conciliation and mediation, 
although there are general texts that compliment the work of mediators, 
conciliators, and reconciliators as individuals working toward the redress 
of problems between conflicting parties whether in commercial transac-
tions or family affairs, with no distinct difference between these alternative 
methods of conflict resolution.
5. Concept of Arbitration in Islam: Is it Conciliation, Sụlh ̣ or Justice?
After explaining the concept ṣulḥ in the Sharīʿah, we turn to a very signifi-
cant issue that is the admixture of legal and linguistic concepts of ṣulḥ and 
its effect on the identification of arbitration as ṣulḥ from the point of view 
of the Sharīʿah. It might be acceptable to identify arbitration as a type of 
conciliation and reconciliation in the general linguistic meaning of the 
consideration that arbitration is not binding, at least in the opinion of one 
segment of Sharīʿah jurists. However, it is fruitful to abide with jurispru-
dential terminology, which sometimes give more specific meaning than 
the general linguistic connotations and which has consequential legal 
effects. We will discuss this matter from various perspectives as follows.
47 Abū Dāwud, Sulaiman ibn al-Ashaʾath, Sunan Abī Dāwud, Ḥadīth 4273, and the 
Ḥadīth is corrected as per Al-Albani, Muḥammad Nasiro Eldeen, Series of Correct Ḥadīth, 
Vol. 6, p. 141, Ḥadīth 2639.
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5.1. The Need to Differentiate Arbitration between Spouses and Other 
Arbitrations
Arbitration between spouses is a form of arbitration under Sharīʿah law,48 
which normally comes to mind when speaking about arbitration as a legal 
term. This may be due to the excessive judicial usage of this term in past 
and present times, which makes individuals who are not Sharīʿah experts 
understand that this kind of arbitration is the only one available under 
Sharīʿah law. This kind of arbitration is also confused with general arbitra-
tion, when vital differences between the two forms go unnoticed. Among 
those who made this mixture are El-Ahdab49 and George Sayen.50 If we 
return to veracity of arbitration in the case of conflicts between spouses, we 
will find that jurists hold different opinions with regard to the role of the 
arbitrator. The majority of jurists51 are of the opinion that an arbitrator’s 
award is binding upon the spouses regardless of whether they are consid-
ered arbitrators or agents of the spouses, as stated by Ibn Taymiyyah. 
Despite this, the practice in Saudi Arabia,52 for example, follows the opin-
ion of the majority of jurists, which binds the judge with what arbitrators 
have determined, unless the award infringes upon the Sharīʿah. Another 
opinion that considers arbitration between spouses by a third party as part 
of ṣulḥ and non-binding is held by Ibn Ḥazm53 (d. 456H) and Ibn Taymiy-
yah54 (d. 728 H), and is one of the Mālikī opinions.55 This opinion is 
based upon the consideration that such arbitration is reconciliatory, and 
that the mediator ought to resolve the conflict informally. This might be 
48 Gamal Eldin Attia stated that: (In this context, the spouses follow an approach laid 
out by Islamic law for arbitration in the event of a dispute between them and for severing 
the marital bond if the dispute becomes insoluble). See Attia, Gamal Eldin, (April 2008, 
International Islamic Institute), Towards Realization of the Higher Intents of Islamic Law: 
Maqasid al-Sharīʿah: A Functional Approach, p. 130.
49 El-Ahdab, supra note 44, pp. 25-27.
50 George Sayen, “Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Traditional in Saudi 
Arabia”, J. Int’l Econ. Law 24 (Winter 2003): 944-945.
51 Ibn Taymiyyah, supra note 3, p. 386.
52 The judgment issued by the General Court in Riyadh on 15 November 2003, and 
also the judgment issued by the same court in November, 2004, both judgments issued by 
Judge H.A. Abdulaziz.
53 Ibn Ḥazm, Alī ibn Aḥmad, Al-Huhala, Vol. 10, p. 87.
54 Al-Baʾali, supra note 30, p. 250.
55 Al-Zargani, Abdul Baqi, Sharh al-Zarqani ʿalā Mukhtasar Khalīl, Vol. 4 (Beirut: Dār 
al-Fiqr) p. 62.
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the meaning intended in Qurʾānic texts, in light of Allāh’s words regarding 
arbitrators in spousal arbitration which can be translated as follows:
And if ye fear a breach between them twain (the man and wife), appoint an arbiter 
from his folk and arbiter from her folk. If they desire amendment Allāh will make 
them of one mind. Lo! Allāh is Ever Knowing, Aware.56
The Almighty uses the expression of amendment with regard to vanishing 
evil between spouses, which is left to the choice of the spouses.57 This 
stands as evidence that reconciliators and arbitrators are just mediators. In 
fact, the opinion of the majority of jurists does not support arbitration as 
just a form of mediation from the viewpoint of the Sharīʿah, because it is 
binding upon the spouses, as well as the judge, to follow the award of the 
arbitrators.
5.2. Third Party in Arbitration
Arbitration, as another means of settling dispute (i.e., conciliation and 
mediation),58 differs from ṣulḥ in that it is performed by a third party. The 
third party in arbitration is the arbitrator(s) selected by the parties.59 Some-
times the judge appoints the arbitrator. Islamic scholars require specifically 
that the arbitrator must be a Muslim,60 an adult, and sane. Scholars argue 
56 The Holy Qurʾān, Sūrah An-Nisāʾ, Q4:35.
57 See, in general, Doi & Clarke, supra note 1, p. 217.
58 See, e.g., M. Hunter, The Freshfields Guide to Arbitration and ADR; Clauses in Interna-
tional Contract (Deventer: Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers, 1993) p. 65.
59 Y. Al-Samaan, The Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, 1st edn. (Dār al-Andalus for Publ. & Dist., 2000) p. 255.
60 From my own point of view, the requirement that the arbitrator be Muslim is subject 
to review, especially if we consider the rules of international arbitration and economic and 
commercial relations between countries around the world. It is not logical to make this 
condition an evaluation criterion for the efficiency of the arbitrator. In addition, since the 
function of the arbitrator is similar to that of the judge, we require the arbitrator to comply 
with all of the conditions required of the judge. Many arbitrators and international arbitra-
tion centers are directed by non-Muslims. Therefore, if we abide by this condition, we will 
forfeit the opportunity to benefit from others and create artificial barriers that will preclude 
us from commercial and arbitral connections with other countries, particularly in the 
Western World. It could be said, however, that, if an arbitration is in one of the Islamic 
countries and the parties request the application of the Sharīʿah rules and principles on the 
subject of the dispute, a non-Muslim arbitrator must have a deep understanding of Sharīʿah 
rules and principles. In addition, there is no evidence from the Qurʾān, Sunnah or ijmaʿ 
requiring that an arbitrator be Muslim. This condition was opined by scholars from the 
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on other conditions, such as soundness, male gender, and accuracy of the 
senses.
5.3. Arbitration Enforcement
Under the Sharīʿah, arbitration is unlike conciliation, which is not obliga-
tory. The four major Islamic Schools agree that, when an arbitration award 
is issued, it will be obligatory for both parties. Neither party will have the 
right to retreat, provided that the award is not contrary to the Sharīʿah. 
The obligatory nature of arbitration is manifested in what has been said by 
the majority of jurists. Hence, it is not accurate to say, as some researchers 
have, that the Sharīʿah is unclear about the obligatory nature of arbitration 
for the parties. For example, Faisal Kutty states that “There is no clear posi-
tion on this question in any of the four leading Sunni schools.”61
Disagreement in the Sharīʿah regards the extent to which arbitration 
obligates the parties after commencement of proceedings and before issu-
ance of the award. The legal arguments in fiqh appear in highlighted opin-
ions of some Sharīʿah scholars that say that the arbitration agreement is not 
binding upon either party. This argument can be avoided by adopting 
another fiqh opinion,62 which says that the arbitration agreement obligates 
all parties after commencement of the arbitration proceedings, from which 
time no party has the right to withdraw. This opinion was reached by the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy in its Decision No. 91(8/9)63 and conforms to 
Sharīʿah intention, which calls for the respect of contracts and its obliga-
tion for both contracting parties. This coincides with modern arbitration 
past, while the general rules and sources of the Sharīʿah authorize judicial and commercial 
dealings with non-Muslims. Applying this condition reflects a critical position and an 
unnecessary contraction. The principles of Sharīʿah law accompany tolerance, brotherhood, 
justice and the facilitation and the lifting of the critical issues. This idea was supported by 
the General Muftī of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Chairman of the Senior Schol-
ars Commission views that a non-Muslim may be an arbitrator and member of the arbitral 
tribunal provided that he is aware of the general principles and concepts of the Sharīʿah. 
(The author (Essam) had an interview with the Saudi Grand Muftī, Shaykh Abdulaziz bin 
Abdullah al-Sheikh, on Thursday morning, 19 February 2009 in Riyadh).
61 Kutty, supra note 2, p. 597.
62 This is the opinion of Mālikī and some Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī jurists and was stated to 
Imām Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal. See Al-Mawirdi, supra note 35, p. 382; Ad-Dirdir, Ash-Sharh 
As-Saghīr, Vol. 2, p. 516; Ibn Qudamah, supra note 15, p. 95.
63 M.H. Siddiqui,“Arbitration under the Sharīʿah with a case study of Saudi Arabia”, 
Transnational Dispute Management 2( January, 2005): 9.
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laws, in which there is great benefit to Islamic countries, especially those 
which attract international investments in oil and gas contracts, such as 
the GCC States.64 It should be noted here that the Great Mālikī Faqīh Ibn 
Mageshon holds a distinct opinion, as he sees that arbitration should 
become obligatory once the parties agree to arbitrate and even before the 
arbitrator starts to study the case. Some, such as Al-Samaan, state that this 
is a Mālikī opinion, which he reports to all Mālikī fiqh.65 In fact, it is an 
opinion of several but not all Mālikī scholars.
5.4. Arbitration Award Enforcement and Mandatory Execution
Whenever an arbitration award is issued, it becomes effective and appli-
cable to the conflicting parties. No party has the right to retreat or with-
draw, unless the award is contrary to the Islamic Sharīʿah. This is the 
opinion of the majority of jurists in the Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī66 
Schools. Their philosophy reasons that arbitration is a contract like any 
other contract, which means that it should be fulfilled and abided by as a 
solid principle of the Sharīʿah. On the other hand, some Shāfiʿī 67 jurists 
opine that an arbitration award is not obligatory unless all parties accept it. 
They reason that willingness is a vital condition to the formation of arbi-
tration at the start, and it must remain so at the end. No doubt this opin-
ion makes arbitration similar to conciliation, which is merely an attempt 
to reconcile the parties without having any obligatory effect. The rules of 
Sharīʿah law reject such a liquidation of the effectiveness of arbitration by 
exposing the entire arbitration process to a unilateral revocation, especially 
if good faith is not available from both or either party.68
It may be useful to accept the opinion of the majority of fuqaʾhā, because 
it gives an arbitration award dignity and strength as a judicial judgment. 
This coincides with modern requirements and the necessity to use arbitra-
tion to settle national and international commercial disputes. The majority 
64 See, e.g., Samir Salah, Commercial Arbitration in the Middle East (Oxford and Port-
land, OR: 2006) p. 41.
65 Al-Samaan, supra note 59, p. 257.
66 Al-Mawirdi, supra note 35, pp. 282-283; Al-Majallah, Article 1848; Ibn Farhoun, 
Tabsirat al-Ḥukkām, Vol. 1, p. 44; Al-Ghazalī, Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad, Al-Wasīt, Vol. 7 
(Cairo: Dār al-Salam, 1997) p. 1; verified by Aḥmed Muḥammad Ibrahim and Muḥammad 
Moḥamed Tamer, p. 50.
67 Ibid.
68 See, in general, Nudrat Majeed “Good Faith and Due Process Lessons from the 
Sharīʿah”, Arbitration International 20(1) (2004): 104-109.
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of modern arbitration laws in the Islamic world adopt this opinion. On 
the other hand, evidence of the strength and effectiveness of an arbitration 
award in Sharīʿah law and in which it has surpassed contemporary Western 
Law may be found in the fact that a majority of fuqaʾhā from the Mālikī, 
Shāfiʿī, Ḥanbalī69 and some Ḥanafī scholars70 have agreed that, if an arbi-
trator has issued his award in accordance with the roots of Sharīʿah prin-
ciples, the judge has no right to overrule the arbitrator’s award. The award 
is effective and applicable even if it conflicts with the judge’s opinion, and 
the judge should assume responsibility for implementation of the arbitra-
tor’s award. This position is based on the viewpoint that the arbitrator’s 
award is correct and issued from a legal authority and that it is, therefore, 
irrevocable. Imām Abū Ḥanaf and several Ḥanafī scholars71 believe that 
the arbitration award can be revoked if the judge does not agree with the 
award. They contend that, while the arbitration award binds the disputing 
parties, it does not bind the judge, who has the right to accept or revoke 
the award. This opinion is in agreement with the majority of contempo-
rary national arbitration laws, which allow an appeal of the arbitration 
award under certain conditions.
5.5. Position of Women as Arbitrator, Witness or Party in Conciliation in 
the Sharīʿah
Scholars of the four schools of fiqh disagree whether male gender is a 
requirement to be an arbitrator.72 Mālikī, Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī jurists say 
that the male gender is a condition and that, as a result, a woman is not 
allowed to serve as an arbitrator.73 They support their opinion by saying 
that arbitration is similar to jurisdiction, and that since women are not 
allowed to handle jurisdiction, therefore, by qiyās (reasoning by analogy), 
they ought not to be involved in the arbitration process. In contrast, Ḥanafī 
69 Ibid.; see also Siddiqui, supra note 63, p. 8.
70 Ibn Nujaim, Zainuddin ibn Ibrahim, Al-Bahr ar-Raʾiq, 2nd edn., Vol. 7 (Beirut: Dār 
al-Māʿrifah) p. 25.
71 Al-Sarakhsi, supra note 38, p. 111.
72 Al-Baji, Suleiman bin Khalaf, Al-Muntaqa Sharīʿah al-Muwattaʿ Malīk, Vol. 4 (Cairo: 
Al-Sādah Printing, 1912) p. 113; Al-Asbahi, Malik bin Anas, Al-Mudawanah al-Kubrā, 
Vol. 5 (Beirut: Dār al-Sāder) p. 49; Al-Shirbini, supra note 20, p. 261; Ibn Abī al-Dam, 
Ibrahim Ibn Abdullah, Adab al-Qadī, The Iraqi Ministry of Endowments, Vol. 1, p. 431.
73 Ibn Mazah, Burhanuddin bin Muḥammad, Al-Muhīt al-Burhanī, Vol. 3, p. 398; Al-
Sarakhsi, supra note 38, p. 111; Al-Mawirdi, supra note 35, p. 626; Ibn Qudamah, supra 
note 15, p. 39; Ibn Ḥazm, supra note 53, p. 490.
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and some Mālikī jurists, such as Ibn Jarir al-Tabarī and Ibn Ḥazm 
al-Andalusī, opine that women have the same rights as men to handle 
arbitration.74 Their position is based upon the view that the female gender 
does not prevent women from understanding and resolving issues in a 
dispute or arguments of opponents. Furthermore, Caliph Omar Ibn 
al-Khatṭạ̄b (d. 23H) appointed a woman (Al-Shifāʾ) to serve as supervisor 
of the markets where she monitored the safety and accuracy of goods from 
fraud. In Islam, this process is called (ḥisba) and demonstrates that a 
woman is capable of handling the arbitration process. Perhaps this opinion 
is correct, since women are just as capable as men in acquiring soundness 
of mind, science and knowledge that will enable them to act in accordance 
with an arbitrator’s function. Moreover, some women have surpassed men 
in the science of law and arbitration. Comparing arbitration to jurisdiction 
is inaccurate, because jurisdiction is a public authority and binding upon 
both the parties to the dispute as well as others. In contrast, an arbitrator’s 
role is limited to the case to which s/he is assigned and, when s/he issues 
the award, the judge will execute it. This opinion has been adopted by 
some contemporary scholars, such as Wahba al-Zuhaili75 and Abdul Karim 
Zeidan.76 The Sharīʿah does not prevent a woman from playing an active 
role in mediation and conciliation. The Sharīʿah encourages civil society to 
adopt conciliation in general and is comprehensive for men and women 
without exception unless there is a clear statement from the Holy Qurʾān 
and the Sunnah identifying one gender rather than the other. However, in 
a wonderful step which confirmed the support of the Islamic Sharīʿah, 
women were given a role in the fields of arbitration and reconciliation and 
hired by the Saudi Minister of Justice to work as consultants in Saudi 
courts. This step will exert a positive impact in serving and helping the 
legal system and society. The new Saudi Minister of Justice, Muḥammad 
El-Eesa, indicated the importance of introducing the Law of Arbitration 
and reconciliation as a major step in the right direction when he said: “We 
hope to introduce a law for the arbitration and reconciliation that will 
highlight, reduce and control the problems and family violence.”77
74 Ibid.
75 See Al-Zuhaili, Wahba, Al-Fiqh al-Islamī wa Adilatah (Islamic Jurisprudence and its 
Evidence), Vol. 6, p. 757.
76 Zeidan, Abdul Karim, Al-Mufasal fī Aḥkām al-Marāʾ wa l-Bait al-Muslim, Vol. 8, 
p. 421.
77 Sabq electronic newsletter, issue dated 17/5/2009 (18-05-2009, 18.45 p.m.). http://
www.sabq.org/?action=shownews&news=6739.
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From the author’s point of view, if this were supported by a governmen-
tal organization, which would deal with arbitration and reconciliation cases, 
this organization would be responsible for enforcing this law and would 
play a positive role under the supervision of the legal system, the impact of 
which would become stronger, more positive and deeply rooted.
Arbitration procedures, including the testimony of female witnesses and 
the rules of evidence in front of a judge, are the same in arbitration.78 In 
other words, a woman’s testimony in front of an arbitrator is equal to half 
of a man’s testimony79 under Sharīʿah law.80 Allāh states in the Qurʾān the 
wisdom of making man’s testimony equal to the testimony of two women. 
Allāh says:
And call to witness, from among your men, two witnesses. And if two men be not (at 
hand) then a man and two women, of such as ye approve as witnesses, so that if one 
of the two erreth (through forgetfulness) the one of them will remind.81
This wisdom stated in the Qurʾān82 is identical to the reasoning by schol-
ars83 as to why a man’s testimony equals that of two women. According to 
Sharīʿah philosophy in all its legislation, a Muslim should abide by this 
even though he does not know the wisdom behind it. Allāh, who creates 
both men and women, knows the characteristics of each gender. Forgetful-
ness occurs equally in both men and women, although it might occur 
more frequently in women due to their passion. The wisdom behind the 
legislation may or may not be known.84 It may be only a mere meta-
physical worship. A Muslim is not required to seek the wisdom hidden in 
some Sharīʿah legislation.
78 Majeed, supra note 68, p. 106.
79 It should be noted that Jewish law, secular laws in Switzerland and French law treats 
the testimonies of men and women differently. See Abdul Hamid El-Ahdab, Arbitration 
with the Arab Countries (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) p. 580.
80 Salah, supra note 64, p. 50.
81 Sūrah Al-Baqara, Q2:282.
82 It is noteworthy that the context of the verse indicates clearly that this position is only 
required when conducting business affairs. See Khaliq, Urfan “Beyond the veil?: An analy-
sis of the provisions of the women’s convention in the law as stipulated in Sharīʿah, Buffalo 
J. Int’l Law, 2(1) (1995): 27.
83 Al-Kasani, supra note 31, p. 7.
84 See, e.g., Mustafa Aḥmad al-Zarqaʾ (1967), Al-Fiqh al-Islamī fī Thawbihi l-Jadīd, al-
Madkhal al-Fiqh al-Islamī [An Introduction to the New Version of the Principles of Islamic 
Jurisprudence] Vol. 1, pp. 50-59.
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What is required from male and female Muslims alike is the acceptance 
of Allāh’s legislation, to recognize without any doubt and to believe deeply 
in his or her heart that this is for the good and benefit of mankind.85 Tes-
timony in the Sharīʿah may present differing aspects, some of which may 
find a man’s testimony totally unacceptable. In some situations, such as 
women’s private affairs, which are difficult for men to understand, testi-
mony is limited to women only.86
5.6. Balanced Analysis
We can justify the opinions that most Islamic scholars reached stemming 
from their understanding of the Holy verse (ayah) and from Prophet 
Muḥammad’s (PBUH) traditions. When the framework and regulations 
for the process of testimony was set, which Islam took into consideration, 
it was the era when the Qurʾān was being revealed and during Prophet 
Muḥammad’s (PBUH) message. During this era, a woman’s status was far 
inferior to that of men. Some Arab tribes used to bury female babies alive 
and, in most tribes, women were deprived of any inheritance. Throughout 
history, women have experienced periods of fair treatment when they have 
enjoyed civil rights while during other eras they have been denied such 
rights. Such conditions also occurred simultaneously but in different soci-
eties and cultures with diverse policies. Moreover, male family members 
such as fathers, brothers, husbands or even sons could put pressure on 
women and influence her ability to give proper testimony. That is why 
Islam provided a fixed rule that should be applied regardless of the time-
frame or social or political circumstances; i.e. a woman’s testimony equals 
half that of a man’s testimony regardless of whether she lives in a society 
which respects and grants her civil rights or treats her differently to the way 
men are treated. Generally, each legal system has a fixed law that will be 
applied regardless of the exceptions that may occur due to social or politi-
cal change. What attracts our attention is that the differentiation between 
a man’s or woman’s testimony is not just dominated by Muslims as we 
may suspect at first glance. Jewish laws and some recent Western laws treat 
85 From an interview the author (Essam) held with Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Abdullah 
Alsheikh, General Muftī of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Chairman of the Senior 
Scholars Commission, on Thursday, 19 February 2009.
86 Ibn Rushd, supra note 14, p. 453; see also Abū Habib, Saadi, Mawsuwat al-Ijmaʿ fī 
l-Fiqh al-Islamī, Vol. 2(2101), p. 602.
390 E.A. Alsheikh / Arab Law Quarterly 25 (2011) 367-400
testimonies differently.87 If we revised the context of the Qurʾānic verse 
mentioned above, we might notice that it evolved to deal with the topic of 
documenting debts and salam contracts88 in particular. This is a clear way 
for contracting parties, as well as debtors and creditors, to document their 
deals in the form of contracts by first writing down their conditions before 
verifying their existence. Where the verse refers to the topic of testimony, 
it encourages contracting parties to seek the presence of a third party dur-
ing the process of drawing up a contract. Such a third party (s/he) must be 
ready to bear the burden of testimony and be both capable and committed 
to understanding and memorizing the deal, which makes him/her able to 
testify to the correctness of the contract between parties if called in front 
of a judge. Actually, if we scrutinize carefully the context of the verse 
(ayah), we will find that it refers to capability and readiness to carry the 
burden of testimony; however, there is a difference between carrying the 
burden of testimony and actually testifying. If a woman forgets several 
details during her testimony, then she can ask another woman to help fill 
in the gaps. This second woman should also be willing to carry the burden 
of testimony in the same case. From the previous analysis, we can say that 
the stipulation (condition) that women carrying the burden of testimony 
must number two and not only one, may not mean that one woman’s 
account would be rejected if she neither doubted the accuracy of her testi-
mony nor failed to remember details when called upon to testify in front 
of a judge. The context of the verse is about carrying the burden of testi-
mony, not the actual testimony. That is why contradictory opinions in 
jurisprudence occur between scholars on the extent to which a single 
87 See El-Ahdab, supra note 79, p. 580.
88 A salam contract is one type of contract that has received much attention from Islamic 
laws. Scholars define this contract as being guaranteed where a current price is paid at the 
signing of the contract. This means that the contracting parties agree on the basis that one 
party will deliver specific merchandise at a specific date in the future, while he will receive 
its price at the time of signing the contract. It is important to mention that scholars have 
indicated that salam contracts are excluded from the general rules of business (sale). In 
other words, the salam contract contradicts the conditions that should be fulfilled in sales 
contracts that the merchandise has to be owned by the seller at the time of the deal or 
contract. Islamic law has allowed it, however, out of necessity in everyday life. Islamic law 
ignores the harm that might be caused if the seller does not have the merchandise (goods) 
in his hands at the time of the contract, in exchange for the benefits and gains for the 
people working with this type of contract. The order to make a contract simply states that 
one party will make or manufacture an article of merchandise such as clothes, pipes, spe-
cific products, etc. and that the buyer will receive the price at the time of contracting, while 
the seller will provide the product on the date set in the contract.
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woman’s testimony can be considered valid regarding debts and all finan-
cial matters in general. Shayk Abd al-Rahman al-Saady, who is one of the 
greatest Saudi scholars in recent years (1376H 1956 CE), indicated that 
we can accept one woman’s testimony in this case; his argument is that the 
wisdom in the above-mentioned verse can be achieved in one woman’s 
testimony and does not require a man’s testimony to validate it.89 If we 
look attentively at various Qurʾānic verses which mention financial testi-
mony, we will find no discrimination on the basis of witness gender.90 In 
other words, whether male or female, witnesses should be treated equally. 
Acceptance of one woman’s testimony as equal to one man’s testimony 
was left to the judge’s discretion; especially in cases where one woman’s 
testimony is considered insufficient and unacceptable, many rights will be 
lost and harm done. This is supported by the fact that Muslim women 
have full control over their finances and wealth according to Islamic law, 
which demonstrates that women have full control over their commercial 
business without male interference. Therefore, in a conservative Muslim 
society, such as that in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it may be difficult for 
women to ask men to bear witness of their dealings and carry the burden 
of testimony, especially in the case of business contracts in which all parties 
are women. Here we have reached a crossroad where we must reconsider 
the value of one-women testimonies. Should they be made equal to one-
man testimonies in commercial business deals by diligently studying holy 
verses applicable in the current situation to achieve justice or right law 
(al-ijtiḥad ), thus fulfilling needs and doing what is right in specific cases 
decided by a judge? Or should one-woman testimonies, which can lead to 
the loss of some rights for both men or women, be validated because wit-
nesses might die leaving the court with one female witness or one female 
and one male witness. With regard to such a situation I. Nyazee says:
[t]he evidence of two women being equal to that of one man. This requirement is 
derived from a verse of Qurʾān, and is supported by the Sunnah . . . [I]t is suggested, 
however, that the scholars of this age may try to interpret the relevant verse of the 
Qurʾān as implying a recommendation rather than an obligation. It should be remem-
bered again that rendering testimony is primarily a duty and not a right, through it 
leads to the protection of rights.91
89 Abd al-Rahman Ben Nasser, Al-Saady, Taysīr al-Karīm al-Raḥman fī Tafsīr Kalām 
al-Manan, Vol. 1 (Al-Risalah Organization, 2000) p. 119.
90 Justice Aftab, Hussain, Status of Women in Islam (Lahore: Law Publishing Company, 
1987) p. 278 et seq.
91 Nyazee, supra note 4, p. 121.
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5.7. An Opinion in the Middle
Some scholars, such as George Sayen, stand in the middle regarding iden-
tification of arbitration under the Sharīʿah. He believes that arbitration in 
Sharīʿah law first resembles conciliation and then develops until it becomes 
obligatory for both parties and must be implemented.92 If we understand 
the nature of the role of conciliator, i.e. to encourage parties to reach a 
mutually acceptable solution to settle a dispute,93 then we can support this 
directive and adopt the opinion of some scholars regarding the non-oblig-
atory nature of arbitration, especially during the early stages of the arbitra-
tion process. This doctrine is acknowledged and currently being put to 
practice in Western customs, where conciliation is applied as a first step 
and then arbitration is directly put to practice.94
6. The Contemporary Concept of Arbitration in the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia
Arbitration has been known in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since 1930, 
when the Commercial Court Act was established which organized arbitra-
tion into five Articles95 as a means to settle disputes. Although arbitration 
was dealt with in several Articles, at that time it was considered a wonder-
ful pioneering incentive offering an alternative means for ending commer-
cial disputes.96 In 1958, the Saudi Government lost its case against the 
American Oil Company (ARAMCO),97 which both parties had agreed to 
arbitrate,98 which was a powerful shock that affected the development of 
92 Sayen, supra note 50, p. 932.
93 See Steven J. Burton “Combing conciliation with arbitration of international com-
mercial disputes”, Int’ Law & Comp. Law Rev. 18 (1994-1995): 640-641.
94 Ibid., pp. 652-656.
95 Articles 493-497.
96 Although this law was issued early, it tackled important aspects of arbitration in a way 
that coincides with the achievements of modern arbitration doctrines. For example, the law 
included conditions which should be in arbitration, a method for appointing arbitrators, 
the duration of arbitration, and other important points.
97 Evidence of this is in Article 31 of the ARAMCO Concession Agreement of 1933 and 
Article 45 of the Getty Oil Concession Agreement (1949). See, e.g., Y. Al-Samaan, “Settle-
ment of Foreign Investment Disputes by Means of Domestic Arbitration in Saudi Arabia”, 
Arab Law Quart. (9(3) (1994): 218.
98 “The Government of Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco)”, Int’l 
Law Rep. 27(1963): 117.
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arbitration in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.99 That loss may explain the 
current lack of knowledge in the Saudi commercial community regarding 
arbitration.100 In spite of that loss, the Saudi Government continued to 
develop arbitration through the issuance of an independent law for arbi-
tration by Royal Decree in 1983.101 To institutionalize arbitration and 
make it more independent, the law gave the Saudi Chambers of Com-
merce power to create arbitration tribunals. This encouraged many foreign 
investors to state in their contracts that these Chambers would handle 
arbitration under the umbrella of the Saudi Arbitration Law (SAL).102 It is 
 99 See, e.g., K. Carlson, “International role of concession agreement”, North Western 
Univ. Law Rev. (1958): 624.
100 The Saudi Government concluded an agreement with a Greek company in 1954, the 
term of which was 30 years, which involved granting the Greek company a privileged right 
to transport the oil and its derivatives from the Kingdom by sea. The Kingdom requested 
ARAMCO to respect the terms of this agreement, but ARAMCO alleged that the agree-
ment, concluded in 1933, gave it an absolute right to choose the means of transporting the 
oil and its products, including transport on foreign oil vessels not belonging to ARAMCO. 
Unable to resolve the case amicably, the Kingdom agreed with the parties to opt for arbitra-
tion and signed an arbitration agreement on 23 February 1955. This began the Saudi 
Government’s suffering with international arbitration, as the parties differed over which 
issues came under the scope of Saudi law and which did not. The Arbitration Tribunal held 
that the Saudi law was based upon the Ḥanbalī School and that it is complemented, when 
necessary, by the general principles of international law and the prevailing custom in the oil 
industry. However, the tribunal declined to solicit the assistance of experts with broad 
knowledge and practice of Saudi law and the rules of the Sharīʿah and alleged that Saudi 
law as represented in the Ḥanbalī jurisprudence was inadequate to handle the case and that 
it should be complemented by other legal sources. In actual fact, Ḥanbalī jurisprudence is 
one of the broadest and most productive Islamic sects in dealing with transactions and 
commercial contracts. It is characterized by a wealth of general rules that govern contracts 
and concessions. This means that we need to revert to the specialists to ascertain the posi-
tion of the Sharīʿah regarding the terms of the case, a step which regretfully the court 
refused to take. It is quite unfortunate that the Arbitration Tribunal’s conduct in this case 
supports the opinion that international arbitration tribunals take arbitration as a means of 
imposing hegemony of the Western legal culture on different world nations without show-
ing any respect for the national laws of those states.
101 As time passed, the KSA took upon itself the development of its national laws, and 
so the author has re-drafted them in a manner that made it possible to achieve transparency 
and an easy reference as applicable laws derived from the Sharīʿah, and in general consistent 
with the system of international arbitration laws. This began a second renaissance of arbi-
tration that has continued to grow and develop to the present day. In concurrence with the 
Kingdom’s joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), most national laws pertaining 
to the judiciary, trade and investment have been updated.
102 Al-Juhaini, Aiydh (1985), “Explaining the new Saudi Arbitration Law”, Chamber of 
Commerce Magazine, Riyadh, p. 22.
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clearly surprising that the Saudi judicial system created a supportive role 
for arbitration unlike the majority of other traditional laws, since the judi-
cial system is suspicious, if not completely opposed, to arbitration. There 
are two reasons for this welcomed behaviour, the first of which is histori-
cal. Arbitration has been the way to resolve major conflicts in the Gulf 
region long before arbitration was accepted in modern countries. Arbitra-
tion was not limited to a specific area of law but assumed the role courts 
play in modern countries. Inherent to arbitration was the free will of con-
flicting parties to choose the arbitrator(s). Arbitration has usually been a 
powerful custom amongst Bedouin tribes and is a suitable system for social 
and political environments. The second reason is the positive view held by 
Islam towards arbitration. Both reasons provide a solid foundation for 
arbitration. It is therefore not surprising to learn that one of the first agree-
ments endorsed by the Kingdom is the New York Convention (NYC).103 
The following are the most distinctive points of the 1983 law:
(1) The law did not distinguish between commercial and other disputes, 
such as civil and real estate disputes.
(2) The law acknowledged agreements between parties to refer any 
future emerging disputes to arbitration. This is known as the arbi-
tration clause.104
(3) The law granted the Saudi Judiciary authority and a prominent role 
in supervising arbitration.105
Notwithstanding these encouraging points, SAL is still considered out-
dated and no longer in keeping with the Kingdom’s great leaps forward in 
the field of international commercial, especially after joining the WTO.106 
There is an urgent need to issue a new law of arbitration or at least review 
the current Articles and amend them to suit contemporary commercial 
transactions, because the current law will soon have passed through three 
decades without having undergone any development or modernization. 
103 Eid Rawach & R. El-Rayes (2006), “The Law of Arbitration in Saudi Arabia, Reality 
and Perceptions”, Int’l Bus. Law J., Forum Europeen de la Communication, France, No. 
5, pp. 617-618.
104 M. Chaudhri & M. Clodfelter “Commercial Arbitration in the Kingdom”, Middle 
East Exec. Rep. 8(7) (1985): 9.
105 Sayen, supra note 50, p. 912.
106 World Trade Organization, 1995.
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The Kingdom’s joining the NYC107 creates a sense of relief for foreign 
investors regarding their investments in the Kingdom, despite the fear by 
some that foreign awards will not be implemented in the Kingdom or that 
they may be revoked by the competent court.108 The process of executing 
foreign arbitration awards in the Board of Grievances also needs to be re-
drafted so that it will clearly define for foreign investors the concept of 
public policy and its limitations, because the Sharīʿah provides several 
interpretations according to the four Islamic Schools, and even within the 
same Ḥanbalī School.
7. The Practical Difference between the Application both of ṣulh ̣ and 
Arbitration in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
In general, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, arbitration is a combination 
of the Islamic concept derived from the Ḥanbalī School and the contem-
porary concept known in the West.109 The principles established by the 
SAL provide that the obligations of the participating parties come under 
the authority of the judiciary that endorses arbitration documents to ensure 
their suitability for execution, and the obligatory nature of the award 
issued to the disputing parties. These principles demonstrate that arbitra-
tion in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is moving towards the modern con-
cept of arbitration as an effective method of dispute resolution, as seen in 
the Western world. In fact, application of Saudi arbitration cannot be con-
sidered conciliation or ṣulḥ due to the nature of the obligation, which is 
clear and obvious, whether arbitration is national or international, in or 
outside the Kingdom. Saudi arbitration procedures are applicable to inter-
national agreements to ensure the application of foreign arbitration awards 
unless they conflict directly with the Sharīʿah. If it appears to the Saudi 
judiciary that the parties agree to settle their dispute through arbitration, 
107 New York Convention (NYC) on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitration Awards, 1958.
108 See, e.g., Kristin T. Roy (Note) “The New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can 
a Country Use the Public Policy Defense to Refuse Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbi-
tral Awards”, Fordham Int’l Law J. 18(1995): 921.
109 See, e.g., Nayla Comair-Obeid, The Law of Business Contracts in the Arab Middle East: 
A Theoretical and Practical Comparative Analysis (with Particular Reference to Modern Legis-
lation) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996) p. 119.
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whether in an independent agreement or as a clause in the contract, then 
the Saudi judiciary will refer the parties directly to arbitration.
Award of the Board of Grievances states that:
In accordance with the contract signed between the two parties, they agreed to refer 
this dispute to arbitration and each of them chose an arbitrator, and the third arbitra-
tor had been selected as stated in the signed arbitration document. Accordingly, the 
case has been transferred to the Arbitration Commission.110
From this practical application of arbitration, we find that the Saudi judi-
ciary, whether in general or summary courts, applies conciliation, reconcil-
iatory ṣulḥ rather than issue a certain award not depending upon amicable 
ways to settle disputes. This application applies to many types of cases: 
marriage, civil or commercial. In fact, marriage arbitration is conciliation 
because it is based upon the effort of the arbitrator to reunite the family, 
to bridge the gaps, and to bring forward viewpoints of the spouses to pre-
vent divorce.111 An award from the General Court at Riyadh includes that 
an arbitration commission is established, meets with the spouses, and 
issues a resolution addressed to the judge that includes the following:
A meeting was held with the parties. We tried several times with the wife to return to 
the matrimonial home for the mercy of her children, but she insisted on divorce pre-
senting her initiative to hand over the above-mentioned financial compensation for 
the husband to divorce. Lately, the husband agreed upon her initiative with a condi-
tion that she gives up custody of her children in his favour, and the wife agreed.112
On this basis, the wife hands over money to her husband in front of the 
judge. Accordingly, the judge passes judgment establishing separation 
between the spouses following the husband’s utterance of divorce before 
the honourable judicial panel.
Regarding ṣulḥ, the Saudi judiciary expands the circle for offering ṣulḥ 
to the parties to prevent judgment without reconciliation between them.113 
The judiciary manifests a desire to calm the parties down and occasionally 
to take into account the financial circumstances that may hinder the defen-
110 Judgment No. 18 /D/ Commercial/1/ in 1416H in Case No. 1929/1/G in 1413 in 
case Al-Babtain for Commerce and Middle East System v. Software Middle East GMBH, p. 34.
111 See Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System, Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden: 
Brill Academic Publishers, 2000) p. 141.
112 Judgment issued from the General Court at Riyadh in November, 2004.
113 See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 111, p. 120.
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dant’s payment of debt or the amount claimed, which could cause the 
defendant to end up in prison. The judge considers these points and per-
suades the plaintiff to waive some of the money and reconciles between the 
parties before the judge issues his award based upon the reconciliation. 
Application of reconciliation in front of a judge comes in different forms, 
depending upon the status of the case. We can identify major features for 
these types of reconciliation which frequently occur in Saudi courts:
(1)  The amount claimed by the plaintiff is not identified. As illustra-
tion, assume that the plaintiff demanded in court that the defen-
dant repair the damage caused by the latter to a property or the 
body of the plaintiff. In normal cases, the judge will assign experts 
in the specific field to assess compensation. However, in most cases, 
the judge offers reconciliation to the parties with his desire to resolve 
the issue as soon as possible so that the case will not be appealed.114 
In this type of case in particular, a fiqh issue (obstacle) exists because 
Mālikī jurists, along with Imām al-Shāfiʿī, require that, for recon-
ciliation to be valid, it must be identified as a sales contract, which 
requires in every case that the price be known by both parties.
Imām al-Shāfiʿī stated: “Reconciliation on an unidentified thing is not 
valid, because Reconciliation is a sale, and a sale on an unidentified thing 
is not valid.”115
In fact, in this type of compensation, in which the plaintiff ’s claim is 
for an unknown value, the Saudi judiciary seems to adopt the view of 
Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī scholars, who approve the reconciliation even if the 
amount of compensation claimed is unidentified. Their philosophy is that 
reconciliation is similar to exoneration in that both parties have the right 
to waive the whole claim. They support their opinion by the idea that, if 
reconciliation is valid when the parties know the claimed amount, then 
reconciliation is no less valid if the claimed amount is unknown. Perhaps 
the strongest evidence in favour of their opinion rather than that men-
tioned in the Mālikī opinion is that of Prophet Muḥammad who ordered 
two people who had a dispute over the value of a very old inheritance to 
come to him to resolve their dispute. Although the Prophet ordered them 
to reconcile and share the inheritance, each expressed forgiveness to the 
114 Judgment issued from Summary Court at Riyadh, No. 352/7 in 1429/8/1H 
(2008).
115 Ibn Qudamah, supra note 15, p. 490.
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other before Allāh for any shortage or damage occurring during the shar-
ing process.116
(2) The second type, which is common among the Saudi judicial rank, 
is the same classical type of reconciliatory ṣulḥ contract in Sharīʿah 
law, where the plaintiff has to give up willingly part of his claim in 
order to solve the case quickly and amicably. The same justifications 
for the first type of reconciliation apply here, i.e. that the judge 
desires to end the dispute quickly before it becomes subject to 
appeal.117 The judge’s desire to close each case quickly and to avoid 
the issuance of a final award may, however, force either or both par-
ties to take the case to the Court of Appeals and perhaps on to the 
Supreme Court. All of this forces judges to offer reconciliation to 
the disputing parties in every case to avoid a backlog of cases being 
appealed. This attitude must be reviewed and not be permitted to 
continue in current practice. Justice requires that the judge enter 
judgment in favour of the party who has, by proper evidence, proven 
his right to prevail. The judge must not press either party to waive 
any right for the sake of reconciliation. Parties should be free to 
pursue an alternative method of resolving their dispute or to press 
their case to conclusion at trial without undue pressure from the 
judge. The extent to which judges apply pressure upon parties to 
settle must be explored through a specialized comprehensive statis-
tical study. This point is left for Saudi law researchers, especially 
those who wish to complete their higher education at a Ph.D. stage. 
It is an important issue, and understanding its dimensions may cre-
ate positive proposals for decision-makers, who may reflect in review 
and develop a new judicial attitude that will achieve desired justice.
8. Conclusion
We can summarize what has been discussed above as follows:
(1)  Arbitration has always been a means of settling disputes, whether 
between individuals or between tribes. Islam approves, organizes 
116 Al-Shawkani, Muḥammad ibn Alī (2002), Nail al-Awtār min Aḥadīth Sayid 
al-Akhyār, Vol. 5, p. 253.
117 Judgment Issued from Summary Court at Riyadh, No. 111/7 in 1429/8/1 (2008), 
Judgment No. 109/7 in 1429/8/1 (2008) & Judgment No. 110/7 in 1429/8/1 H (2008).
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and promotes arbitration from non-obligatory to a contract binding 
upon all parties with the power of a judicial judgment.
(2)  There has been confusion between the linguistic and legal concepts of 
ṣulḥ. Some consider arbitration under Sharīʿah law as nothing more 
than conciliation, because here arbitration is not obligatory, even after 
issuance of an award and, therefore, resembles conciliation. Confu-
sion about arbitration in cases between spouses and all other types 
of cases contributes to this concept. The first concept (linguistic) 
resembles conciliation, while the second is similar to the contempo-
rary Western concept of arbitration. Some believe that arbitration 
under Sharīʿah law is conciliation gradually upgraded to obligatory 
arbitration whenever award is issued. This is a considerable opinion.
(3)  Sharīʿah law offers several interpretations of arbitration and its 
obligatory nature in general. However, a majority of the scholars in 
the four schools agree that an arbitration award is binding upon all 
parties whether it offers them satisfaction or not. Contemporary 
Islamic fiqh adopts Mālikī as well as several Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī 
opinions in asserting that continuation in arbitration is binding 
upon both parties directly after commencement of the arbitration 
proceedings. The fact that no party has the right to retreat complies 
with the Sharīʿah principle, which always assures respect for con-
tracts and fulfilments.
(4)  The majority of scholars from the four schools agree that a party 
may dismiss the arbitrator before commencement of arbitration 
proceedings. In fact, this should not be understood as a way to 
retreat before commencement of arbitration. Parties who agree to 
participate in arbitration must be bound by that agreement to fulfil 
their commitment. There is a difference between the right to dis-
miss an arbitrator and continue with a different arbitrator and the 
termination of the entire arbitration process.
(5) We can summarize the differences between arbitration and recon-
ciliatory ṣulḥ according to the Sharīʿah as follows:
  I.  Arbitration results in a judicial award, while ṣulḥ results in a 
contract agreement between disputing parties. There is a dif-
ference between the judicial award and consensual contract.
  II.  In ṣulḥ, one or both of the parties waives rights, in contrast to 
arbitration in which no rights are waived.
  III.  Sụlḥ is an obligatory contract binding upon both parties, 
while, in the opinion of the majority of scholars, arbitration is 
not obligatory until the issuance of an award.
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  IV.  Sụlḥ takes place after a dispute has occurred and the plaintiff 
has asserted his/her claim against the defendant, while arbitra-
tion may be agreed upon prior to, during, and after the dispute.
 V.  Sụlḥ has multiple forms under Sharīʿah law, depending upon 
the condition of the defendant, while there is only one type of 
arbitration regardless of the dispute.
  VI. Jurists ( fuqaʾhā) stipulate that the arbitrator must satisfy cer-
tain conditions, such as having the male gender, being Mus-
lim and sanity, none of which are stipulated for ṣulḥ parties.
VII. In arbitration, a third party serves as the arbitrator(s) and 
manages the arbitration process, while in reconciliation the 
presence of a third party is not required.
  Sometimes, it is possible for a third party to interfere as 
mediator; the judge may offer both parties reconciliation to 
assist in solving the issue amicably.
(6)  There is a difference between the application of arbitration and 
reconciliatory ṣulḥ in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Arbitration is 
governed by a special law, which combines the Islamic and Western 
concepts of arbitration. While reconciliatory ṣulḥ is often encour-
aged by judges and practiced in the corridors of the courts, it is 
useful to establish a Board in the Ministry of Justice that deals with 
reconciliation to supervise, monitor and document any reconcilia-
tion between the parties. This step will enhance the status of recon-
ciliation and reduce the judiciary’s role to notarization. Moreover, 
the culture of reconciliation would prevail in the society as an alter-
native means to resolve disputes.118
118 A few days after writing the draft of this article, the Chief Judge of the Summary 
Court in Riyadh, Dr. Salah Alsheikh, announced that the Riyadh courts have established 
divisions for Arbitration, Reconciliation and Mediation where they will work on family, 
traffic and judicial cases. This recommendation was confirmed in public, which shows how 
important and how badly needed it was. It is a great step in supporting the process of Arbi-
tration, Reconciliation and Mediation by organizations in a civil society represented by the 
legal system. See the newspaper Al-Riyadh, Issue 14905, 15 April 2009 (16-05-2009, 15:45 
p.m.), http://www.alriyadh.com/2009/04/15/article42252.html.
